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Muslims Through American History and Culture Before 21st Century: A Review

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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a brief chronological review of American cultural representations of Muslims through major historical events. Situating the development of these cultural works within their historical milieus elucidates their evolution and development. We begin with the influential role played by the British and French Orientalist traditions on American first perceptions of Islam and Muslims, American Barbarian Wars, the Greek revolt against Ottoman rule to the missionaries and tourists to the Holy Lands. Nevertheless, the post WWII era seems to have the most accelerated growth in American perception of Islam and Muslims where more geopolitical and economic interests emerged. These historical landmarks will form the structure of the article which reviews how American historical and cultural means have molded images of Islam and Muslims across time and space. Images of Muslims seem to be overshadowed by American religious, economic and political interests. Inherited Orientalist traditions were reinforced through these interest-based representations.

Keywords: Islam, Muslims, American Culture, American History, Orientalism

INTRODUCTION
With the rise of populist discourse in the United States and Europe in recent years (Stockemer, 2019), Islam and Muslims have become entangled in a growing prejudicial and discriminating atmosphere (Khan et al., 2019). Muslims are increasingly presented as an existential threat to the West by a variety of high-level politicians and leaders in the West (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). However, the creation of the Muslim other in Western thought has a long history that participated in forging today’s language of fear and contempt (Arjana, 2015). “[I]maginary Muslim monsters have determined the construction of the Muslim in Western thought [. . .] The character of the
homicidal terroristic Muslim stalks the Western social imaginary in print media, television, and film, but he has ancestors” (Arjana, 2015: 1). For decades, western perceptions of Muslims have developed through multiple direct and indirect encounters that participated in shaping current imageries of the other.

Literature is abundant with studies that address American representations of Islam and Muslims throughout history. However, they were either period-oriented or focused on particular cultural form. Hence, there arises the need for a brief historical and cultural review of the major historical events and cultural forms that have molded current American perceptions of Muslims. Addressing these representations within a brief illustration of their historical circumstances provides a clearer delineation of the whole process that influenced the creation of contemporary language on Islam and Muslims. Beginning with the influential role played by the British and French Orientalist traditions on American first perceptions of Islam and Muslims through American Barbarian Wars (1801-1815) to the Greek revolt against Ottoman rule in 1821, American encounter with Muslims began to develop and shape dramatically. American travel writers, missionaries and tourists to the Holy Lands began to form their own perceptions of the Levant according to their biblical references. However, the post WWII era witnessed the most accelerated growth in American perception of Islam and Muslims where more geopolitical and economic interests began to emerge. These historical landmarks will form the structure of the article which reviews how American historical and cultural works have shaped images of Islam and Muslims across time and space. Literary works and movies are chosen in terms of their significance, influence and popularity during these historical moments.

MUSLIMS’ EARLY PRESENCE IN AMERICA

Despite the fact that presence of Muslims in the United States of America predates the creation of the nation, Americans do not believe in a shared past (Curtis, 2010). As early as the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, Muslims, abducted and enslaved from West Africa, constituted the first significant Muslim population (Gomez, 1994; Curtis, 2009; Curtis, 2010; GhaneaBassiri, 2010). However, the first chronicled Muslim presence in America was in the 16th century of a Moroccan slave (Manseau, 2015). Muslim slaves’ narratives remain among the most significant writings related the early history of America (GhaneaBassiri, 2010). Even though Muslims have contributed in shaping American history (GhaneaBassiri, 2010), they have been excluded from that history and assigned a status of newcomers rather than cofounders of America (Curtis, 2010).

In the course of the first years of the republic, images of the Muslim tyrant and despot derived from the Orientalized Ottoman Turks were invested in forming the American democratic identity. Islam was constructed as the cultural enemy and antithesis of the very basis of the American Christian values (Marr, 1997). Douglas Little (2002) maintains that,

“The Puritans who founded “God’s American Israel” on Massachusetts Bay nearly four centuries ago brought with them a passionate fascination with the Holy Land and a profound ambivalence about the “infidels”—mostly Muslims but some Jews—who lived there. Raised on Bible stories and religious parables laced liberally with a fervently Christian sense of mission and a fiercely American Spirit of ’76, the citizens of one of the New World’s newest nations have long embraced a romanticized and stereotypic vision of some of the Old World’s oldest civilizations. The missionaries,
tourists, and merchants who sailed from America into the Eastern Mediterranean during the nineteenth century were amazed by the Christian relics and biblical landscapes but appalled by the despotic governments and decadent societies that they encountered from Constantinople to Cairo (9).

Generally, the average American of those times built his knowledge about Arabs and Muslims from the Bible and Thousand and One Arabian Nights. However, most Americans used to recall Ali Baba and the forty thieves and St. Matthew’s Gospel. They also remembered the crusades and regretted the fact that the Holy Land was populated by Muslims and Jews who were, according to most Americans, infidels (Little, 2002).

Similarly, “Enlightenment authors” found the distorted images of Islam useful to caution Americans against dangers of despotism, opinions suppression, tyranny and anarchy in order to further their political views (Allison, 2000: 35). Consequently, throughout the eighteenth century the image of Islam continued to be unchanged (Allison, 2000). Representations of Islam were utilized to advance religious, political and cultural agendas. Allison elaborates, “sexual tyranny became the ultimate form of Muslim political tyranny” (61). These images of Muslims as unrestrained sexual machines found much interest between American readers. “[T]he fictional Muslim world, the world of unrestrained sexual power, was also soberly reported in Western newspapers, magazines, and travelers’ accounts” (Allison, 2000: 61). Consequently, the image of Muslims and their countries were fictionalized to serve the interest of both the American public and political circles.

BARBARY WARS, CAPTIVITY NARRATIVES AND THE MAKING OF THE BARBARIAN IMAGE

One of the first American direct encounters with Arab countries was the Barbary Wars. These wars played a significant role in shaping early American perceptions of Arabs and Muslims. Accordingly, between 1801 and 1815, as American ships refused to pay tributes while passing through the Mediterranean to Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunis, which were called Barbary States by Americans at the time, the American ships were attacked, and some American sailors were taken as captives. Through these years, the United States fought two wars against these nations and finally accepted to pay tributes to some of these countries. As these countries were called Barbary States, their populations were labeled as barbarians (Rosenblatt, 2009; El-Shinqiti, 2013). Though most captivity narratives emerged after Barbary Wars, some of these narratives appeared years before these wars. Captivity narratives contributed in the American perception of the Muslim Orient (Voss, 2006; Rosenblatt, 2009; GhaneaBassiri, 2010; Bowen, 2015).

In Louisa, a tale published in 1790, the British citizen Louisa is captured by the Algiers and sold as a slave to Osmen, whom she teaches American values of liberty and freedom, which consequently leads him to free all his slaves. By illustrating the bad example of the Algiers who sold those captives and made them slaves, American values of liberty and freedom were stressed and emphasized (Voss, 2006). While in Royall Tyler’s The Algerine Captive, which was originally published in 1779, Updike Underhill, the main American character, recapitulated his idea of America by means of comparison with the Arab countries he lived in as a slave. He elucidated, “I had suffered hunger, sickness, fatigue, insult, stripes, wounds, and every other cruel injury; and was now under the roof of the kindest and tenderest of parents. I had been degraded to a slave, and was now advanced to a citizen of the freest country in the universe” (Tyler, 1816: 239). Thus,
American freedom and modernity were exemplified in the projection of their opposite viewpoints in the Arab countries. However, in Peter Markoe’s *The Algerian Spy in Pennsylvania* (1787), danger is presented as coming from the outside in the form of an Algerian spy who landed on the American soil.

Similarly, Barbary plays such as Susanna Rowson’s *Slaves in Algeirs* (1794), David Everett’s *Slaves in Barbary* (1797), James Ellison’s (1812) *The American Captive* and Sarah Pogson’s (1818) *The Young Carolinians* projected the supremacy of the American values of freedom and Christianity and the need to spread both Christianity and freedom throughout the world (Voss, 2006). Though not new to the old Orientalist notion of spreading the values of the civilized world, such a burden of spreading American values also implicated American arising imperial interest in the Levant.

Conversely, *Humanity in Algiers, or the Story of Azem* (1801), a novel with an anonymous author, presents the image of the Algerian merchant and his freed Senegalese slave quite differently from their contemporaries in American narratives. Azem, the protagonist, pays a bequest to free an American captive as he is used to do every year, for Azem himself was a Senegalese slave who has been freed by his grateful Algerian master (Allison, 2000). Allison (2000: 95) contends that Azem, “would not have had this opportunity in America had chance enslaved him there instead of in Algiers”. However, this novel has been circulated in, “a small area in Vermont and upstate New York” (Allison, 2000: 100), which indicates the insignificance of both its influence and reception on the American cultural arena.

Though fictional, Barbary narratives were used as historical sources which contributed to create the negative image of the non-fictional Muslim world (GhaneaBassiri, 2010; El-Shinqiti, 2013). Though some of these Barbary narratives have been written by American captives who have had experienced first-hand real situations, they trailed a design previously “set in American literature,” a design inaugurated by 17th-century Puritans seized by Indians (Allison, 2000: 109). American narratives endorsed good qualities such as “strength and power” through their negative representation of their opposites, Muslims in this case (Allison, 2000: 109). These images of Muslims as persecutors of the American captives and Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) as an “imposter” were essential to the American perception of the Muslim world as they were utilized to promote American sense of liberty and freedom (112). Unmistakably, American writers expressed their dissatisfaction with the status of Americans as captives by means of fabricating and exaggerating negative images of Muslims which were further supported by inherited stereotypes (Parker, 2004). In general, American literature on Barbary reinforced “the sense” of American racial and religious superiority over Muslims. The Orientalist image of Islam as a religion of “sensual pleasure” was reproduced and Muslims were depicted as sexually obsessed and women oppressors (El-Shinqiti, 2013: 17).

Barbary wars have left ineffaceable traces in the American perception of Islam and Muslims which are still resonant to the present. Joseph Wheelan (2003) acknowledges that,

> While the Barbary War resembles today’s war on terror tactically and strategically, it resonates most deeply in its assertion of free trade, human rights, and freedom from tyranny and terror [. . .] The United States did not hesitate to go to war for its closely held beliefs, as America’s enemies have come to learn since 1775” (xxvi).

9/11 attacks have reinforced both the long-perceived Orientalist images of Islam and Muslims as well as America’s first military encounter with Muslims in North Africa. Differences between
Americans and Muslims, “whose customs, history, and religion were alien to the early American experience” (xxvi), was reestablished to authorize and justify the war against its old-enemy, Islam.

**GREEKS’ UPRISING, AMERICAN TRAVELS TO THE HOLY LANDS AND THE MAKING OF THE MUSLIM OTHER**

The Middle East began to gain more interest for the American cultural and political landscape in the nineteenth century, principally during the second half (Christison, 1999; Little, 2002; Rosenblatt, 2009). American merchants found new trade horizons in the area while American missionaries, who sought to save more lost “souls,” were, “spreading not only the gospel but also subversive New World ideas” (Little, 2002: 14). The Holy Land has been a site of religious significance since the founding of the United States (Grewal, 2014). The United States’ missionary institutions began to spread “anti-Turkish” thoughts under the cover of “national independence,” however, Americans, “laced with Orientalism,” doubted Arabs’ ability to take up such an upper act (Little, 2002: 14). The Orient was not believed to have the capability of changing since he/she was assigned a backward status that confirms his/her inability to modernize and appreciate the fruits of liberty.

By the 19th century, Americans became more acquainted with the Muslim world (Said, 1979). However, such knowledge seemed to aggravate the situation and reinforce the negative images. “[S]tandardization and cultural stereotyping” strengthened in the “academic and imaginative demonology of “the mysterious Orient”” (Said, 1979: 26). The Greek revolution against the Ottoman rule loomed to provide more vigor to a rising assertion of the clash between Islam and Christianity (Little, 2002; Rosenblatt, 2009). Constantine Hatzidimitriou (2015: 4) contends that, “[m]ost Americans perceived the struggle in Greece in religious terms as a battle between merciless Muslims and enslaved Christians who longed for religious freedom [. . .] many Americans viewed the Greek war as a struggle against tyranny similar to their own recent national revolution.” Noticeably, American earlier Orientalist views of Muslims’ hostility towards Christians began to gain more ground, especially after their military encounter with Muslims in Morocco, Algeria, Libya and Tunisia.

In 1931, the American vessel *Friendship* was seized by Malays in Kuala Batu after disputing with its crew over the weighing of the goods, which resulted “three American deaths and the confiscation of its loads” (Marr, 1997: 129). As a result, Commodore John Downes, affected by his previous encounter with Muslims in the Barbary Wars, attacked Kuala Batu at dawn and killed a hundred of innocent Malays, among them women and children, without investigating the incident (Marr, 1997). Downes generalized his military experience with Muslims in North Africa and decided to take action against Malay Muslims, as they were also Muslims, despite the fact that those Malays were from a quite different cultural background and thousands of miles far from the Mediterranean. For Downes, Malay Muslims were ultimately like ‘aggressive’ Arab Muslims in North Africa; consequently, they were attacked without proper investigation of the episode (Marr, 1997).

Americans’ familiarity with Islam in the middle of the 19th century was still scanty; they used to call Muslims, “‘Mahometans’ (adherents of Muhammed and not of God) or ‘mussulmen’ or ‘mussulmen’ (which engenders the stereotype of muscle-bound brutes)” (Curiel, 2008: 47). Islam was still regarded as a threatening danger to Christianity, as Muslims were still controlling the Holy
Land (Curiel, 2008; Majid, 2012). Noticeably, Washington Irving’s *Mahomet and His Successors*, which was published in 1850, had a great influence on American authors’ and academics’ view of Islam. Though Irving’s book lacked historical accuracy, it was well received in the American milieu (McDonald, 2010). Irving’s book on Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) served to emphasize previous erroneous information about Islam and consequently, widened the gap, for Americans, between Islam and Christianity.

However, American travel writers to the Holy Land were the most significant contributors in populating certain perceptions of the Middle East and Arabs in the nineteenth century. Most nineteenth-century American writers, like Nathaniel Howthorne, Edgar Allan Poe and Mark Twain, built heavily on Western Orientalism to embody the Orient; however, Herman Melville had the most profound experience with the Ottoman Empire and the Middle East which was reflected in his later works (Marr, 1997). Both Melville and Twain were considered to be among the greatest literary figures. They demonstrated great interest in the Middle East; The Holy Land occupied an important part in their works with abundant references and allusions. John McDonald (2010: 58) contends that, “Herman Melville is perhaps the most problematic writer of the 19th century in terms of situating cultural Islam in his works.” Despite Melville and Twain’s endeavors to present Islam and Muslims in a more seemingly objective and less stereotypical form than other travel authors, they were also involved in stereotyping the Orient, even though with less severity and frequency (McDonald, 2010). Timothy Marr (2006: 541) stresses Melville’s positive references to Ishmael, “as the Abrahamic ancestor of the Arabs. The Islamicist stance of making Ishmael the only survivor empowered Melville to criticize Christian civilization from a position that, although biblical, was also one aligned with Islam.” Nonetheless, Queequeg, the character with Muslim characteristics in *Moby Dick*, has been described repetitively as a “cannibal,” “savage” and a “Pagan” (McDonald, 2010: 58). Thus, in spite of Melville’s mostly positive portrayal of Ismael, he could not escape Orientalizing the Muslim-like Queequeg.

Mark Twain was probably the most significant person to shape 19th century American “views” of the Middle East (Little, 2002: 13). Generally, American pilgrims ignored Arab culture and people in Palestine to satisfy their biblical imagination of the land. However, some chose to defile Arabs as filthy and deceitful to express their dissatisfaction with the unanticipated Arab reality there (Rogers, 2011). American pilgrims, “somewhat bewildered by Palestinian culture,” wanted to guard Arabs’ being, “picturesque children and to fear them as savage tribesmen,” however, it is noteworthy that “the presence and existence of the historical Arab Christian community was hardly noted at all” (Rogers, 2011: 14-15). In *The Innocents Abroad* (1869), Mark Twain’s remarked that American travellers to the Holy Land, “were full of partialities and prejudices, they entered the country with their verdicts already prepared, and they could no more write dispassionately and impartially about it than they could about their own wives and children” (Twain, 1869: 511). Despite Twain’s criticism of the American travellers to the Holy Lands for building their pertaining judgments on Orientalist, rather than realistic, knowledge of Palestine, he pronounced Jerusalem as a desolate and dull place, “suggesting the invisibility of those living there” (McDonald, 2010: 58). Palestine was perceived as an unoccupied land waiting to be populated (Said, 1979), and the native people of Palestine, Arab Palestinians, were, “mired in dirt, rags, and vermin” (Little, 2002: 13). Twain’s exaggerated depictions of Arabs, “have become grist for the mills of those who propagate the line that Palestine was a desolate land until settled and cultivated by Jewish pioneers”
What mattered for Twain was the holy space, not the Arab populace. Therefore, he presented Palestinian Arabs as “dirt,” a temporary and undesired presence in the Holy Land, to be evacuated and replaced by the modernized Westerners.

Twain’s “gloss” portrayal of Palestine and its Arab people, “before mass Jewish immigration [, is] also often used by U.S. propagandists for Israel” (Christison, 1999: 16). Yet, Twain’s was only one of “literally hundreds of travel books” about the Holy Land distributed in the United States and Europe, “throughout the nineteenth century that conveyed an image of Palestine and its Arabs; the image was almost without exception derogatory, although often less dramatically drawn than Twain’s” (16-17). Palestinian-Israeli matters in the late 20th century were perceived within “the frame of reference” that began forming when the image of Palestine took hold in the middle of the 19th century, when Orientalists, missionaries, pilgrims, and travelers like Twain, visited Palestine and declared their impressions of the Holy Lands and their people, Palestinians (Christison, 1999: 17). Thus, Twain’s demonstrations of both the land and the people of Palestine were intended to endorse the future state of Israel (non-existent at that time), the imperialist Zionist entity in Palestine.

In Twain’s *Huck Finn*, Huck and his friends make the runaway slave dress in Arab-like clothing to hide the slave from his master, then they attach the phrase, “sick Arab—but harmless when not out of his head” [original emphasis] (Twain, 1884: 209). McDonald maintains that such example, “suggests two extremes of behavior, and reinforces popular cultural stereotypes about Arabs—either harmless and ineffective, or extremely and irrationally crazed. Disguising a slave as an Arab may also suggest to Twain’s readers at the time that Arabs in America were to be viewed in society as at the same level as the African slave” (58). Twain could not escape the influence of Orientalism on his perceptions of the Orient as he saw the Holy Land, the most sacred Christian site, populated by Muslims. Americans have built on their old-established Orientalist views about Arabs and Muslims; they have not endeavored to establish their own observation-based knowledge.

THE RISE OF HOLLYWOOD AND THE PRODUCTION OF ISLAMIC OTHERNESS

As American film industry came into life at the dawn of the twentieth century, film became the most current cultural form and the fastest medium for proliferating knowledge and culture to both literate and illiterate audiences. Film also enabled viewers from different backgrounds access to the new world of moving pictures and showed them, “what they would otherwise not be able to see, including exotic lands, peoples, and events” (Rosenblatt, 2009: 61). From the beginning of the American film industry in the 1920s, the Arabs, Turks and Kurds were strongly present within a frame of representation built on a Darwinist conviction of their inferiority to Americans and Europeans (Little, 2002). Hollywood continued to manufacture a repetitive scheme in representing Arabs negatively since the beginning of the nineteenth century to the point that these negative images became popular and “the other” was later defined by these stereotypical perceptions (Shaheen, 2009). For filmmakers and film viewers, Arabs and Muslims have been characterized in terms of their otherness and difference from ‘normal’ Americans and Europeans. These otherized images of Muslims, as the hostile enemy of civilization and modernity, were used to pursue growing American imperial interests in the Middle East (Arti, 2007).
From their very beginning, television and film have played a central part in framing these stereotypes about Arab as no other cultural medium did. Therefore, after examining more than a thousand films, Jack Shaheen (2009) reached the conclusion that the wide majority of these, mostly American, films presented a distorted image of Arabs and Muslims. Shaheen argues that for more than a century, movies like, *The Sheik* (1921), *The Mummy* (1932), *Cairo* (1942), *The Steel Lady* (1953), *Exodus* (1960), *The Black Stallion* (1979), *Protocol* (1984), *The Delta Force* (1986), *Ernest In the Army* (1997), and *Rules of Engagement* (2000), which are still being presented on TVs nowadays, portray Arabs stereotypically.

Only Arabs and Muslims can be categorized within these degrading groups of difference in present day America. Albeit Arabs have been condemned in American movie industry since the very start, “the fact remains that it is acceptable to advance anti-Semitism in film—provided the Semites are Arabs. I call this habit of racial and cultural generalization “The New Anti-Semitism” (Shaheen, 2009: 12). Though it is no longer acceptable to use stereotypes against Jews, other ethnicities or people of color, it is still acceptable do so with Arabs and Muslims (Said, 1979).

Quite similar to other cultural forms, stereotypical portrayal of Arabs and Muslims in the American film industry has been affected by European Orientalism from the initial stages (Shaheen, 2009; Alhassen, 2018); such “images of desolate deserts, corrupt palaces, and slimy souks inhabited by the cultural “other”—the lazy, bearded heathen Arab Muslim [are still used as representative of the present day Arabs]. These fictional renditions of wild foreigners subjugating harem maidens were accepted as valid” (Shaheen, 2009: 13-14). For filmmakers, Arabs are Arabs whether they lived in the twentieth or the nineteenth century; they are the same as before as they cannot modernize or develop in the course of time.

Despite the fact that Arabs have continually had “the roughest and most uncomprehending deal from Hollywood,” stereotypical representations of Arabs and Muslims have intensified and prospered after the Cold War (Shaheen, 2009: 15). After the Cold War, Islam became enemy for the American film industry. Islam occupied the space of the enmity previously occupied by the Soviet Union. Today’s filmmakers’ Islam is linked to masculine authority, Jihad, and terrorism, while Arab Muslims are depicted as aggressive foreign “intruders”, and as lustful, oil sheikhs willing to use nuclear weapons against Americans (Shaheen, 2009: 15). Though newly manufactured aggression-related stereotypes have resurrected after the Cold War, Arabs are still assigned their old imaginative space in the desert or on the backs of their camels. Noticeably, old Orientalism has not been substituted by a new one, but rather, it has been renovated, developed and attached new strategies and designs.

In “Evil” Arabs in American Popular Film: Orientalist Fear, the wicked Arabs and their countries have become Americans’ “antithesis” (Semmerling, 2006: 254). Arabs, “may continue to be so as our national self is more and more compared to “the other” through the nexus of foreign policy” (254). Americans are now armed with, “Orientalist fear” which normalize these biased images of “the other” and make them more realistic to the American audience (Semmerling, 2006: 254). Thus, to serve the interests of the U.S, Arabs, and Muslims in general, are being made the malicious enemy in the American film industry. As the cinematized other is portrayed constantly and persistently in different negative roles and techniques, he/she would be assigned an unconscious negative status in the awareness of the viewers. Later, films audiences will perceive this cinematized other as a reality at work. Consequently, real Muslims will be allotted their
fictionalized and stereotyped traits; the videoed other will be reflected on reality and perceived as a reality on the ground.

**POST WORLD WAR TWO AMERICA, PALESTINE AND BEYOND: THE CONSTRUCTION OF ARABS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT**

After World War Two (WWII), Said (1979) asserts, “and more noticeably after each of the Arab-Israeli wars, the Arab Muslim has become a figure in American popular culture [. . .] very serious attention is being paid the Arab” (284-285). Noticeably, the United States of America replaced the old colonial powers, Britain and France, as the “configuration of forces” changed and occupied their prominent stage in the world. Moreover, “[a] vast web of interests now links all parts of the former colonial world to the United States” (285). Thus, American interests in the Middle East and the Muslims World began a new prosperous era and consequently, the Orient was given more attention. However, as America inherited European colonial interests in the Orient, the U.S. also inherited European knowledge about the Orient, Orientalism in the same way (Said, 1979; Alhassen, 2018).

In 1945, *National Geographic* presented, what its editors designated, a solution for Hitler’s carnages against Jews by suggesting that creating a Jewish State in Palestine, the Holy Land, would be the most appropriate solution for the Nazi death camps’ survivors (Little, 2002). Under titles like, “Americans Help Liberated Europe Live Again,” with numerous pictures of the Jewish victims dislocated after Hitler’s concentration camps, finding an alternative homeland for the Jews became the responsibility of the western civilized world (Little, 2002: 23, 24). Encouraged by western media sympathy and support, “westernized Jews” began reclaiming their “rightful land,” Palestine, the Holy Land (24). Palestine came to the light with its Oriental sceneries, while Arabs were performing “menial tasks” in the background (24). After WWII, western populations were being exposed to an extensive propaganda for the necessity to save the persecuted Jews by helping them to settle in a new homeland. Simultaneously, Palestine was presented as a deserted land without a real population, as Arabs were presented, in the same western Media, as a secondary Oriental decoration rather than a native people of Palestine. In all circumstances, the Orient was being represented without it being given a chance to speak out, as he has not the entity or the ability to do so.

A new westernized state for the Jews in the Holy Land was being systematically structured in the western media. Accordingly, dedicated, systematic and deceptive information about Arabs in general, and Palestinians in particular, was publicized through the many forms of American popular culture. Americans became more impressed with the Zionist dream as it was very similar to their own American dream (Little, 2002). The Jewish refugees who arrived in Palestine were considered “like the Puritans who had had settled New England three centuries earlier, were victims of religious persecution determined to make new lives for themselves in an unforgiving landscape” (Little, 2002: 24). Major American magazines projected images of the courageous Jews who endured, “Hitler’s final solution to make new lives on an old frontier, and of exotic Arabs, one part sheik and one part sharecropper, would do much to shape the U.S. approach to the Middle East after 1945” (Little, 2002: 24). Through misleading representations of Arabs, Palestine was portrayed as desert, without real inhabitants, that needs western Jews’ care and salvage (Said,
1979). Palestinians became the unnecessary Oriental decoration of the place and their very existence in Palestine was questioned likewise.

After the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine (1948), American media and popular culture continued to present their romanticized narration about Jewish sufferings in the Nazi era (Little, 2002). In 1952, *Anne Frank: Diary of a Young Girl*, a Jewish girl’s diary of her last years before she died of sickness and starvation in Hitler’s concentration camps, became a bestseller in the United States. Little contends that “[t]he literary and cinematic connections between the nightmare of the Holocaust and the dream of Israel were drawn most clearly for readers and moviegoers in [1950s] America” (29). Thus, as *Anne Frank* became engraved deeply onto American popular culture, Jews’ miseries became more imprinted in the American popular consciousness and, consequently, the idea of a Jewish state in Palestine was further sympathized and supported.

The Holocaust played the most important part in forming the American popular sympathy with Israel and Israelis with the help of Hollywood which kept producing films about the sufferings of the Jews through those hard times (Little, 2002). While the suffering of the Jews was assigned the largest space of visibility, the suffering of the Palestinians who were under the Israeli occupation were assigned a space of invisibility. After being emotionally and mentally charged by Hollywood and American televisions recurring exemplifications of Jews’ sufferings through the last fifty years, “more than a few must have taken comfort from the knowledge that, whatever Israel’s faults [oppression of Palestinians], it remained the best insurance available against a replay of Hitler’s final solution” (Little, 2002: 40). Hence, Americans felt obliged to overlook Israel’s faults, though these faults have been assigned minimal space of visibility in the American media and popular culture, lest they, Americans, might unintentionally cause another Holocaust to take place in the contemporary times.

Still, Leon Uris’ novel, *Exodus* (1958), was one of the few novels that sold four million copies and won wide critical praise, tells a story of a determined Zionist who brings food, arms and more Jewish refugees into Palestine after WWII (Little, 2002). *Exodus* also relates the story of the survivors of the Nazi camps against ruthless Arabs through a Manichaean encounter between the good Jews and the evil Arabs. Soon, Hollywood produced its four-hour filmed adaptation of *Exodus* with the “Jewish freedom fighter hero,” founding the state of Israel (29). Little (2003: 29) contends that, “*Exodus* reminded American audiences that with the creation of a Jewish state in the Holy Land, Anne Frank had not died in vain.” Evidently, sufferings of Jews was invested in creating Israel and propelling native Arabs out of their own lands. This way, Palestinians paid the price for Hitler’s atrocities against Jews; they became outsiders in their own land.

In the 1960s, movies like *Lawrence of Arabia* (1962), which was awarded six Oscars, recalled the image of Orientalized Arabs who needed Britain’s support, without which, they could not have liberated their states from the Turkish rule (Little, 2002). Though depicted as brave in this film, Arabs were still, “ unlike the Zionists in *Exodus*,” who had established the “independent Jewish state,” Israel (Little, 2002: 30). Conversely, Arabs saw their dreams being destroyed, “by their self-destructive penchant for tribal infighting and political scheming” (30). Either way, Arabs were blamed even for the repercussions of western colonialism in their lands. Moreover, “[t]he images of noble Israelis surrounded by unruly Arabs projected by Hollywood were reinforced by mass market monthlies such as *National Geographic*, whose circulation soared during the early 1960s” (30). Representations of Arabs in the American popular culture and media were not meant to
convey reality, on the contrary, they were meant to distort reality into designed forms that served western colonization of the Orient.

After its victory over Egypt, Syria and Jordan in 1967, what was later called the Six-Days War, Israel became widely viewed, in the West, as the ultimate successful western state, especially when compared to its failing Arab neighbors. The Six-Days War was used as a proof of Arabs’ inability to modernize in terms of warfare. Little adds that, “[f]or the U.S. public, however, the lessons of the Six Day War grew out of popular culture rather than foreign policy” (32). Americans sympathized with the Israelis and, “seemed to regard Israel’s smashing victory as the fulfillment of a biblical prophecy” (32). Shortly after one month, James Michener's *The Source*, an epic novel recounting the “Jewish exile, torment, and eventual redemption symbolized by the creation of Israel,” became the best-seller in June 1967 (32). For many Americans, Israel’s victory transformed, “Jews from victims to victors while branding the Arabs as feckless, reckless, [. . .] weak,” and inferior to Jews (32). The stereotyped Arab changed from a “camel-riding nomad” to an incompetent and “easy defeat” (Said, 1979: 285). Despite the fact that Jews’ and Arabs’ representations in the Western, more specifically American, media and popular culture paved the way for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, geopolitical developments in Palestine were equally essential in shaping future representations of Arabs in the American popular culture.

Furthermore, one of the few dates imprinted in the American consciousness is September 1972, when a small group of Palestinians murdered eleven Israeli athletes at the Olympic Village in Germany (Little, 2002). In 1975, Thomas Harris published *Black Sunday*, a novel about terrorist Palestinians who try to explode a stadium full of spectators during a game between two American teams. In *Black Sunday*, Palestinian terrorists “did not believe in the concept of a “Middle East situation.” The restoration of Palestine to the Arabs would not have elated [them]. [They] believed in holocaust, the fire that purifies” (Harris, 1975: 1). In this way, Palestinians’ struggle against the Israeli occupation of Palestine is illustrated within terrorism framework.

The American “popular attitudes” toward the Middle East after September 1972 would be preoccupied with the images of the Palestinian terrorists and some Arab dictators for the next twenty years (Little, 2002: 33). Thus, the image of the terrorist Arab began to gain more ground and emphasis in the American popular culture as the pictures from Germany began to appear constantly and repeatedly in the media. By overstressing the episode and assigning a large space of visibility to the suffering of the Israelis and the ‘terrorism’ of the Palestinians, such terrorist acts were invested thoroughly to strengthen Israel’s stance against Palestinians and intensify their sufferings with the Israeli procedures.

However, after 1973 Arabs’ victory over Israel, which witnessed Egypt’s recovery of its occupied lands in Sinai Peninsula, the Arabs became “more menacing” in the American media where they were depicted, “standing behind a gasoline pump” (Said, 1979: 285). Consequently, anti-Semitic attitude transformed from Jews to Arabs “smoothly” (285). Edward Said (1979) adds that,

[. . .] if the Arab occupies space enough for attention, it is as a negative value. He is seen as the disrupter of Israel’s and the West’s existence, or in another view of the same thing, as a surmountable obstacle to Israel’s creation in 1948. Insofar as this Arab has any history, it is part of the history given him [. . .] by the Orientalist tradition, and later, the Zionist tradition. *Palestine was seen*—by Lamartine and the early Zionists —
as an empty desert waiting to burst into bloom; such inhabitants as it had were supposed to be inconsequential nomads possessing no real claim on the land and therefore no cultural or national reality. *Thus the Arab is* conceived of now as a shadow that dogs the Jew [Emphasis added] (286).

Obviously, Arabs’ existence in the American popular consciousness depended mainly on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Arabs’ representations were fashioned according to their political and historical interaction with the Israelis. Therefore, the image of Arabs developed as historical circumstances changed, however, within an Orientalist framework (Said, 1979).

Likewise, Arabs’ stereotypes as “oil suppliers” appeared dramatically when Saudi Arabia discontinued its oil supplies to the U.S. because of America’s support for Israel in 1973-War against Egypt and Syria (Said, 1979: 286). In the American popular consciousness, Arabs were not supposed to possess those large oil reserves because they lacked “any Arab moral qualifications” (286). As oil embargo was read as an immoral act and a threat against the America, military invasion of the oil fields was recommended by the media. Arabs’ acts were supposed to be in accordance to western interests; otherwise pertaining stereotypes were immediately produced to criticize such acts (Said, 1981).

After more than twenty-five years of publishing his international best-seller novel, *Exodus*, in 1958, Leon Uris published *The Haj* in 1984. Soon, *The Haj* was the most “widely read” novel which extolled the Arabs’ Orientalist stereotypes (Little, 2002: 38). For Uris, Muslims have lost the ability to love each other by the authority of Islam since twelve hundred years, the date of Islam’s first presence (Uris, 1984). Therefore, Islam is the source of their Muslims’ hatred (Uris, 1984). Sustainable hatred is the energizing and controlling power that keeps Muslims in motion up to the present time (Uris, 1984). However, hatred has revived and resurrected by the Jews’ “return” (Uris, 1984: 523). The Israelis are the rightful people of the Holy Land since their coming to Palestine is considered a “return,” rather than an occupation of a foreign land (Uris, 1984: 523).

Muslims are simply, “a decadent, savage people” and Islam is, “a religion that has stripped them of all human ambition . . . except for the few cruel enough and arrogant enough to command them as one commands a mob of sheep,” while Muslim women are the persecuted slaves of men (Uris, 1984: 74). After printing about two million copies of *The Haj* by 1984, Uris’ Orientalist message “seems to have been well received by the reading public” (Little, 2002: 38). *The Haj* has been a “diseased work” with main premises that Arabs are inhuman while Jews are their noble opposite (Said, 1985: 55); “lest we think of Uris as a vulgar aberration, we should remember that his book […] was on the best-seller list for many weeks, and that it is advertised publicly as a work of penetrating, compassionate, and courageous humanism” (1985: 55). Without any doubt, *The Haj*, “a vile piece of anti-Arab propaganda masquerading as an attempt to understand the Arabs” (Christison, 1987: 401), has extremely invested in an Orientalist discourse to serve and propagate the Israeli occupation of Palestine by defiling its native people. What is more evident is that this novel has influenced, or at least reached, millions of Americans who have shaped their perceptions of Islam and Muslims accordingly (Little, 2002).

Similarly, the image of the Muslim dictator was present in *The Coup*, John Updike’s first major attempt to approach Islam in his narratives. *The Coup*, first published in 1978, relates the story of a Muslim despot who rules the fictional African state, Kush, with a fundamentalist appropriation of Islam. Hakim Ellellou narrates his past when once the absolutist ruler of Kush, the
desert, until he was ousted and later exiled to France. Ellellou once acknowledges that, “[t]he prophet vivid paradise is our atomic bomb” (99). Thus, radical Islam is anticipated as the future threat for America where Ellellou considers suicide bombers as the potential weapon of Islam against America, Ellellou’s most abhorred enemy (Colgan, 2009). Updike’s exemplification of the Muslim tyrant has its origins in the Orientalist tradition when Turks were categorized as despots and dictators.

American perceptions of both Arabs and Muslims have been largely affected by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Muslims have been largely introduced through their blind and impenetrable hatred for Jews. Thus, by building on preceding Orientalist views on the Oriental, stereotypical representations of Arabs and Muslims gained more stamina and vigor in American literature. More emphasis has been laid on “the Muslim other” as an aggressive and hate-mongering person. Generally, in the aftermath of WWII, as America has been more involved in the Middle East and other Muslim countries, Islam has been presented as a destructive as well as restrictive ideology that has sturdy and passive influence on Muslims.

LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND AMERICAN DISCOURSE ON ‘ISLAMIC TERRORISM’
In the American public memory, the year 1980 saw the first light with the images coming from Iran of the Americans hostages held in Tehran. Through 444 days, the period fifty-two American diplomats were held hostages, they “became a national symbol [and] one of the most widely covered stories in television history” in the United States (McAlister, 2001: 198). Consequently, the 1980s witnessed a development in the “the discourse of terrorist threat [...] in new and important ways” (199). This discourse helped in creating, “a subtle but crucial change in the imagined geography of the Middle East, a change that was marked by a reclassification: “Islam” became highlighted as the dominant signifier of the region, rather than oil wealth, Arabs, or Christian Holy Lands” (200). However, none of the old Orientalist paradigms have vanished; on the contrary, they were amplified and invigorated “by a reframing of the entire region in terms of proximity to or distance from “Islam,” which itself became conflated with “terrorism”” (200). The hostage crisis became emblematic of ‘the threat of Islam’ (GhaneaBassiri, 2010). Terrorism-related generalizations about Islam and Muslims intensified as they gained more evidence that proofed their validity at the time.

Furthermore, representations of the American hostage crisis in the American public culture have converted “an emergent political-religious phenomenon into the essential character of an entire region” (McAlister, 2001: 200). Thus, though Iran is a Persian, not an Arab, country, it became the new “synecdoche” for all the Arab countries, the same way “the Muslim World” was used in the 1960s, and 1970s to signify “the Arab World,” despite the fact that most Muslims are from non-Arab countries like Turkey, Indonesia and Malaysia (200). Orientalism after the hostages’ crisis enhanced more emphasis on the previous negative modes. However, despite the fact that it is not accurate to describe all American representations of the Middle East as demonization and distortions of their subject of representation, it is true that Orientalism has an unswerving presence in these public exemplifications.

In the eighties and nineties of the last century, Muslims continued to be present in the American silver screen. Delta Force (1986) depicted Palestinians as psychopathic terrorists, while True Lies (1994) presented a group of Arab fanatics “planning to launch a nuclear attack on Miami”
(Little, 2002: 39). Similarly, films like Executive Decision (1996) or The Mummy (1999) built on an Orientalist tradition for representing their Arab characters. However, The Siege (1998) was perhaps the most controversial American film that provoked wide-ranging protests in the Muslim world. The Siege preserved the image of the “primitive, violent and aggressive Islam by finally developing the Islamic threat into a direct attack on the United States” (Ramji, 2005). In the The Siege, “all Arab and Muslim Americans have become suspects, and are persecuted for information regarding the “homogenous” threat of Islam” (Ramji, 2005).

In 1992, Walt Disney produced the animation film, Aladdin, a love story between Aladdin and Jasmine who were “rather westernized Arabs,” with perfect English. However, the Arab characters were portrayed in an “imaginary oriental sheikdom as frightful thugs sporting turbans, daggers, and thick accents” (Little, 2002: 40). Aladdin had revived Mark Twain’s classic Orientalist appropriations of the Middle East in his travel book, Innocents Abroad (1869), by using some lyrics in the first song, “Arabian Nights,” with its stereotypical “caravan camels roam” and “swarthy merchant croons” (40). Though the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee had convinced the producers to eliminate “the most offensive Lyrics,” the revised edition still mirrored Orientalism “deeply embedded in U.S. popular culture during the preceding two centuries” (41).

Since 1970, film industry executives, directors and writers, “produced, directed, and scripted more than 350 films portraying Arabs as insidious cultural “others.”” (Shaheen, 2003: 188). As stereotypes about Arabs and Muslims, in general, were “self-perpetuating,” stereotyping became powerful and “hard to eliminate” (188). From childhood, American filmmakers were used to watch Western champions “crush hundreds of reel “bad” Arabs” (188). Unsurprisingly, stereotypes were recycled without recognition. Filmmakers were “innocently joining the ranks of the stereotypes’ creators” (188). Popular assumptions about the Orient were exploited and encouraged “as a means of encouraging impulsive consumer spending [. . .] Even the film industry exploited the Orient, transforming it into a commodity available for widespread visual consumption” (Rosenblatt, 2009: 62). Consequently, the Orient was modeled and shaped according to the American market. The Orient was a product rather than a human entity produced and fashioned to satisfy American consumers’ requirements which resulted a more exotic and stereotyped forms of that Orient.

In the 1990s, major American media from National Geographic to Disney Studios presented Arabs and Muslims as oriental Goliaths and Israelis as western David (Little, 2002). In 1999, One Day in September, a documentary about the Israeli Olympians killed in Munich by a group of Palestinians in 1972, won an Oscar for the best documentary film in 2000. While, Rules of Engagement (2000) was considered as one of the most stereotypical films ever in which, “[t]he effects of ethnic exploitation are especially obvious in scenes revealing egregious, false images of Yemeni children as assassins and enemies of the United States” (Shaheen, 2009: 21). In the same year, Nelson DeMille, a best-seller author published The Lion’s Game (2000), a novel recounting the feats of a “ruthless Libyan terrorist,” was a best-seller for weeks (Little, 2002: 42).

The binary opposition between Islam and the West has shaped general American perception of Islam and has also influenced much of the scholarship on Islam in America (GhaneaBassiri, 2010). Americans, who molded America’s perception of “the Middle East from the Barbary Wars through the discovery of King Tut’s tomb[,] reaffirmed orientalist stereotypes as old as the Crusades depicting Arabs as exotic, fanatical, and congenitally predisposed toward
“autocracy” (Little 2002: 41). Within such an Orientalism charged popular culture molded through more than two hundred years, Americans became more exposed to and involved in the mostly negative representations of Islam and Muslims regardless of their nationalities or ethnicities since Muslims were used to be defined and explained only by their being Muslims (Little, 2002; Alhassen, 2018). In the last twenty-five years of the 20th century, “films, books, and magazines continued to depict Arabs as primitive, untrustworthy, and malevolent figures who bore close watching” (Little, 2002: 41). Thus, Orientalism was consumed and reproduced in a successive mode into the various cultural forms in the American medium.

**CONCLUSION**

Presence of Muslims in the United States of America can be traced back to the first days of slavery. Nevertheless, American public interaction with the ‘Muslim World’ was scarce and sporadic in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The first significant American encounter with Muslims in North Africa and the Middle East was in the nineteenth century. As the U.S. became a superpower after World War II, American political and commercial interests in several Muslim countries developed, which resulted more interaction with Muslims in different countries and diverse backgrounds. Yet, American perceptions of the Muslim world were not restricted to their direct encounters with Muslims. Perversely, Americans built most of their founding views on Islam and Muslims on European Orientalism and popular fictional works like *The Thousands and One Nights* and Irving’s book about the life of Prophet Mohammad (PBUH).

Through diverse cultural forms, both Islam and Muslims were largely presented through means of difference and otherness in the past three centuries. Orientalism continued to pose a great influence on American cultural representations of Muslims. Noticeably, the more Americans were involved in the Middle East and other Muslim countries, the more they relied on Orientalist views to perceive and exemplify Muslims. Islam was principally perceived as a hate-mongering ideology as well as an imminent threat for Western interests in the Levant while Muslims were viewed as backward masses or/and fundamentalists.

Shedding the light on American representations of Islam and Muslims through American history helps understand present day discourse on Muslims in the United States and the West in general. It uncovers the roots of current misconceptions and their development through time in order to expose their foundations and implications.

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