

The Challenges Faced by Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) in Preventing Migrant Smuggling Activities at the Malaysia-Thailand Land Border

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Abstract

Weaknesses in the border control management can result in the escape of smugglers at the border gate. While some smugglers break through the sovereign borders with the help of organized smuggling syndicates, others randomly smuggle themselves without the help of intermediaries. This article aims to discuss the factors which lead to the smuggling of migrants, and limitations faced by the enforcement agency in safeguarding the Malaysian sovereign borders. This study focuses on the Malaysia-Thailand border which is controlled by the Royal Malaysian Police (RMP). Based on a series of interviews with relevant ministries, enforcement agencies and other stakeholders, this article found that factors causing migrant smuggling are multifaceted. These include the high demands for irregular migrant labourers, smuggling as a lucrative industry and the growing role of social networks in facilitating smuggling activities. The enforcement agencies also face operational limitations. These include, among others, limited manpower, assets and technology as well as logistical challenges. Based on the findings of this study, the implications is that any effort to strengthen border management must consider three aspects: (i) strengthening human resources; (ii) use appropriate equipment and technologies; and (iii) establish top-down policy that reflects the real needs for countering migrant smuggling.

Keywords: Border Control, Border Security, Migrant Smuggling, Irregular Migrants, National Security

Introduction

Migrant smuggling is a well-established, widespread, and profitable criminal activity for organized crime groups in Southeast Asia. It has become a lucrative business for transnational criminal organisations. Article 3(a) of the UN 'Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants'

(UNODC 2004, Annex III) defines the 'smuggling of migrants' as 'the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident' while Article 3(b) defines 'illegal entry' as 'crossing borders without complying with the necessary requirements for legal entry into the receiving state' (UNODC 2004, pp. 54-55). Migrant smuggling emerges from irregular migration, when and where borders are fixed, relatively impermeable, and protected by a border bureaucracy, which includes border crossing points (Mountz, 2010). Irregular migration occurs when migrants are looking for better life prospects, labor market demand, and move without appropriate authorization. They organize their trip on their own or with the help of family, friends and rely on specialized networks of facilitators. The flow of migrants can be classified as irregular/illegal and have led to the emergence of social and criminal networks (Salt and Stein, 2002; Triandafyllidou and Maurizi, 2011; Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012).

Migrant smuggling is one of the biggest social threats for Malaysia. Hoffstaedter (2014) argued that the movement of victims of smuggling and trafficking is a common thing that occurs across the borders of Malaysia and can result in socio-economic stability problems for the country. This situation has put the national security of Malaysia at stake. Thus, it is significant to know a proactive approach to address the issues at hand. The issues of migrant smuggling and border security on the other hand are interconnected and have significant implications to national security which the trend varies across different regions and countries. In response to this demographic trend, this study will highlight the challenges i.e. the factors of migrant smuggling and the limitations faced by the authorities in preventing this activity in Malaysia. The study on those challenges will help the government to well understand the issues at hand, thus help them to reconcile with the real situation on the ground. This diverse range of security challenges encountered at borders should be tackled accordingly by the government because it remains the first duty of the government to ensure that its nation is secured and its territory is safeguarded from all major risks.

Methodology

This study focused on the 662km Malaysia-Thailand border line starting from Batu Putih, Kedah to Bukit Kayu Hitam, Perlis and from Pasir Mas to Tumpat, Kelantan which is the regulatory control zone of PGA North Brigade and PGA Southeast Brigade. This study used primary and secondary data collected through several methods. Primary data was collected through a series of interviews with relevant stakeholders such as the Internal Security and Public Order Department (KDNKA) Bukit Aman, RMP, the PGA North Brigade, the PGA Southeast Brigade, the National Security Council (NSC) and Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). The informants were selected based on their involvement in the policy formulation process and policy implementation concerning the Malaysia-Thailand land border line. These include a broad-based criterion whereby informants must have served their relevant agencies no less than five years.

Each interview session with the informants was conducted between one and two hours, and audio-recorded with verbal consent from informants. The informants were first briefed on the key principles and ethics applied prior to proceeding with the interview session, and that they were able to withdraw from the sessions at any time. Before conducting the interviews, an ethics clearance process under the auspices of the Research Ethics Committee of the National University of Malaysia (UKM) was obtained for the period from the estimated time for all relevant interviews to be conducted among selected chosen participants, June 16, 2022

until June 15, 2024. A written approval was sought from the Committee on January 3, 2022 with a reference number: UKM PPI/111/8/JEP-2022-352. Consistent with the research ethics requirement, no actual names were used in this article (except the name of the organizations or agencies they are associated with), to ensure the confidentiality of the information and preventing any unintended consequences to informants. In addition to the interview sessions conducted with informants, the study also used the observation method by visiting and observing the security checkpoints at several border lines where fences and border walls were built, and technologies used to safeguard from intrusions. Findings from the observation method was used to support the analysis and discussion. To supplement the primary data, secondary data was sourced through a review of existing literature, newspaper, and government official's publications and legislations related to the topic. Some case laws were also referred. All data and information obtained were processed and analysed using a descriptive and thematic approach (e.g., thematic sequence).

Research Findings and Analysis

The crime of migrant smuggling at the Malaysia-Thailand land border shows a rather worrying trend from year to year despite various efforts made by the government to prevent these activities. The table below shows the number of migrants arrested by the PGA North Brigade and the PGA Southeast Brigade at the Malaysia-Thai land border in general.

Table 1

Statistics of Migrant Smuggling Cases at the Malaysia-Thailand Land Border

Year	Number of Migrant Smuggling Cases	
	North Brigade (Kedah/Perlis)	Southeast Brigade (Kelantan)
2013	264	5
2014	183	753
2015	461	835
2016	224	223
2017	188	-
2018	123	58
2019	95	219
2020	106	167
2021	89	187
2022	375	898
Total	2,108	3,345

Source: KDNKA

Factors of Migrant Smuggling at the Malaysia-Thailand Land Border

There are five factors that lead to migrant smuggling activities at the Malaysia-Thailand land border i.e, the high demand for irregular migrant labourers by the employers who avoid laws and take advantages, the role of syndicates that make migrant smuggling activities a lucrative industry, lack of documentations among forced migrants, migrants who simultaneously smuggle in contraband and the growing role of social networks.

i. Irregular labour migration

Malaysia offers high demand of foreign workers to employers who have their own interests. The opening of many economic sectors in Malaysia has attracted the attention of people from neighbouring countries to come and live in Malaysia by any means whatsoever, including smuggling. According to a PGA Senior Officer¹, there are employers who take an easy way out to obtain workers, especially in the manufacturing, and construction sectors. They skimp on wages to employ legal and registered foreign workers, but they resort to illegal foreign workers in manufacturing and construction sectors because those coming illegally cannot fully assert their right to their employers or will be reported. Hiring foreign workers directly without going through any legal entry procedure makes the process become easier and faster. Taking smuggled migrants as workers becomes a favourite choice because the employers do not abide by any laws, terms, and conditions of hiring foreign workers regulated by the government either in terms of salary or welfare of the workers. In the case of Salim (2014)², the court found that the accused, a Malaysian citizen, had acted as an operator for transporter, namely he used a motorcycle for the purpose of transporting migrants. In this case, the accused was riding the motorcycle, and a 43-year-old migrant, a Myanmar citizen who did not have any valid travel documents, who was a back passenger, was detained by the police at a roadblock at KM27, Jalan Kangar-Padang Besar, Perlis. The migrant entered Malaysia through the Thailand border and entered alone through an agent to earn a living. In Turkey and Istanbul, the number of migrants that have been identified to be illegally employed/ working shows a fluctuating pattern (Gulay et al., 2012). In Europe, economic migrants without documents are mainly Syrian refugees who desperately seeking refuge within the EU (Varun et al., 2016).

ii. Migrant smuggling as a lucrative industry

A lucrative profit is one of the main factors that smugglers are willing to commit this crime of migrant smuggling. The smuggling syndicate will usually make the maximum possible profit from the activity and offer between USD215.35 to USD2153.55 for an irregular migrant who is successfully smuggled³. This payment is accordingly paid based on the role and services provided. This role starts from a spy or a water sweeper, an agent looking for people, and a transporter to a land scout. This lucrative wage offer can reach hundreds of thousands of ringgits⁴. The syndicates usually involve agents who offer services to those who are not knowledgeable about Malaysia, especially in terms of security, geographic location, and transportation. This activity also attracts the victims who are unemployed in their respective countries such as Myanmar, Bangladesh and Thailand as they are targeted by the syndicates. A legal case regarding smugglers who bring in migrants with the motive of seeking profit can be illustrated as in the case of the High Court of Malaya in Kota Bharu, Kelantan concerning Lokman Usuf (2019)⁵, whereby the accused admitted that all Myanmar migrant detainees consisting of eight men and seven women aged between 20 and 37 years who were under his control, were intended to be sent to Kuala Lumpur and he was paid a wage of USD10.77 per

¹ The Senior Officer, KDNKA, Bukit Aman.2022. Kuala Lumpur. Interviewed on 15 July.

² PP vs. Osman Salim [2014]5 LNS 63.

³ The Private Lawyer, a private law firm. Kota Bharu.2023. Interviewed on 3 April.

⁴ Ibid

⁵ PP vs. Mohamad Nazran Mohd Asri and Lokman Usuf [2019] 1 CLJ 131 LNS.

person. Meanwhile in the case of Martullah (2021)⁶, a 15-year-old Myanmar female migrant was smuggled into Malaysia by agents from Malaysia. Her entry was arranged by her boyfriend who was in Malaysia and had entered to work in Malaysia in 2012, also a Myanmar citizen, and a United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) card holder who made a payment to both agents amounting to approximately USD4306.63. This plan was made with the consent and knowledge of her family, who aimed for her and her boyfriend to get married in Malaysia. In this case, she and her friend were taken by two Myanmar agents in the Mungdow sea area. She was then ordered to board a boat carrying 50 passengers to go to Thailand. In Thailand, she and her friend were placed in the forest while waiting for her boyfriend to pay the agent. This case shows that agents have taken advantage by taking a high sum of payment to smuggle a migrant which is no less than USD 2153.32 for each smuggling in and USD2153.32 for smuggling out of the migrant's country of origin. Since criminal networks aimed at facilitating cross border movement where movement is not legally authorized (Salt and Stein, 1997; Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012), the syndicates benefit from the poor and vulnerable of the world who seek a better life and work opportunities in foreign countries (Anna, 2018).

iii. A way to smuggle in contraband

In an incident in Padang Besar, five men, including three foreign migrants aged between 26 and 30 years old, were arrested in a sting operation conducted by the police on February 16, 2023, for being suspected of being involved in a case of migrant smuggling by breaching the border gate of the Malaysia-Thailand land border⁷. An examination of the local suspect found a box of John Black cigarettes which contained 160 red pills with WY written on them, suspected of being horse pills. This case is being investigated in accordance with Section 26a of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants Act (ATIPSOM) 2007 for carrying out migrant smuggling which can lead to a prison sentence of not more than 15 years and a fine. This case is also being investigated under Section 6(1)(c) of the Immigration Act 1959/63. For the offense of possessing drugs, the case is investigated according to Section 39a (1) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 which can be punished with imprisonment of not more than five years and lashes of not more than nine lashes. In addition, this case was also investigated in accordance with Section 15(1)(A) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952.⁸ This case showed that the migrants being smuggled also had smuggled in contraband simultaneously.

iv. Role of social networks

In the case of Martullah (2021), the accused's lawyer made the argument that the accused had assisted two Myanmar migrant women at the request of two of his friends. In this case, the accused was contacted by his friend known as NA on 26 July 2021 who instructed him to pick up a Myanmar woman known as S who had just entered Malaysia from Myanmar. The accused then went to Jalan Tunjong, Kota Bharu to pick up S and brought her to the accused's house. Later, within a month, the accused was contacted by another friend known as B to pick up a woman known as M who had just entered Malaysia from Myanmar. Then the accused went with B to Pasir Tumboh, Kota Bahru to pick up M and M was also taken to the accused's

⁶ PP vs. Martullah bin Abu Bakar Siddik [2021] Unreported case.

⁷ The PGA North Brigade 2022. Perlis and Kedah. Interviewed on 29 and 30 November.

⁸ Ibid

house. At that time, the accused knew that S and M did not have any valid documents to enter Malaysia. With the intention of helping his two friends, the accused did not take any payment or wages to assist the two female migrants, and even had no knowledge of the payment made by his two friends to the agent.

According to Sheldon et al (2018), migrants describe smuggling facilitators as relatives or close friends, acquaintances or distant operators who are members of a social networks of varying relational proximity. The example is illustrated as in the case of US-Mexico border whereby smuggling of migrants is still undertaken by smugglers who are embedded in the Mexican migrant community itself who have entered illegally with the assistance of friends, relatives, and individual (David, 2004).

Limitations in the Enforcement

The limitations faced by the PGA both in North and Southeast Brigade include internal limitations and external limitations. Internal limitations consist of human resource strength, infra equipment, assets, and logistics, as well as the use of modern technology. The external border on the other hand covers other security issues involving the security patrol of roads, border walls, fences, and border areas not gazetted as security areas (restricted areas).

i. Manpower, Workload, and Integrity

The Department of Internal Security and Public Order (KDNKA) through the PGA North Brigade and the Southeast Brigade are among the enforcers responsible for carrying out the task of controlling the Malaysia-Thai land border lines⁹. The KDNKA is headed by a director with the rank of Police Commissioner and assisted by four deputy directors namely the Deputy Director (Movement) of the KDNKA Department (Deputy Commissioner), Deputy Director (PGA) of the KDNKA Department (Deputy Commissioner), Deputy Director (General Policing) of the KDNKA Department (Senior Assistant Commissioner) and Deputy Director (PGK) of the KDNKA Department (Senior Assistant Commissioner). The PGA organization consists of Senior Officers, Junior Police Officers, Constables (Aboriginal People), Constable (Regular), and Support, as well as civil servants. According to the Director of the KDNKA Department, despite a very large number of human resources in PGA, which is approximately 13,135 officers for the whole country, only 38% officers are from the North Brigade and the Southeast Brigade. Multiple tasks of the PGA make it hard for them to control the land border of Malaysia-Thailand, which is wide, long, and porous. The task becomes limited and there are issues of resilience and efficiency among the officers who should be on duty at the border for 24 hours. The relatively limited number of human resources and personnel compared to the workload requirements at the same time makes it quite difficult for the management to place a large amount of personnel in each battalion for border control assignments at one time, especially to accommodate the needs of a wide and long border. This imbalance is alarming for the duty of controlling the national borders which is very wide important as it involves the security and sovereignty of the country. The detailed breakdown of PGA officers is indicated in the table as below.

⁹ The enforcement officer from the Security Department, MHA, 2022. Putrajaya. Interviewed on 19 and 20 Oktober.

Table 2

Statistic of PGA Officers

No.	Formation of PGA	Number of Officers
1.	PGA Bukit Aman (HQ)	46
2.	PGA North Brigade	2907
3.	PGA Southeast Brigade	2056
	Total	5,009

Source: KDNKA

According to Mohan and Shelly (2016), protecting long stretches of borders requires large human involvement in patrolling and monitoring the surrounding area. It is due to the sheer length and remoteness of the borders that provides a great challenge to the authorities to comprehensively control the border (Vishwanath, 2019). The existence of many secluded routes makes it difficult to ensure that there is no illegal movement in and out of this border area. At the Algeria-Europe border, which is the longest of Algeria's frontier that stretches for 6,734 kilometres, it poses a challenge for authorities to monitor because it is remote, difficult to access, and often significantly underdeveloped. While Algeria possesses the largest and most well-funded army in the region and has deployed many soldiers to its frontiers, it has struggled to continuously patrol and monitor the entirety of the frontier (Matt, 2022). Thus, the limitation of human resources at the Malaysia-Thailand border makes the process of monitoring the border to become slow and tiring especially for foreigners entering Malaysia. To avoid congestion, the process is done quickly, but the actual inspection is not done carefully (Rafidah et al., 2019).

ii. Assets and Logistics

In carrying out border control duties, the PGA is equipped with assets such as vehicles for patrolling, security posts for their temporary place of residence, electricity and water supply for their basic needs. The vehicles that are provided for patrolling purposes include a four-wheel drive vehicle, motorcycles, tankers, and cars¹⁰. However, most of these vehicles are old vehicles and have suffered damage and deterioration. According to North Brigade Official¹¹, the vehicles are in rather poor condition and no replacements have been made for several reasons such as allocation and priority issues. In fact, the types of vehicles owned by PGA Southeast Brigade and North Brigade are also limited compared to the actual needs in patrolling the border line. In terms of security posts, the structures are very old, dilapidated and not well maintained. There are still several posts that do not have electricity supply, telephone line, internet access and even sufficient clean water. These essentials are basic needs for the comfort and welfare of every human being to enable them to carry out their duties and work very well. Thus, this situation to some extent affects the smoothness of enforcement affairs in carrying out daily routines and the execution of patrol duties.

iii. Use of Technology at the Border

¹⁰ The PGA Senior Officer, KDNKA, Bukit Aman. 2022. Kuala Lumpur. Interviewed on 15 July.

¹¹ The PGA North Brigade official 2022. Perlis.. Perak, Perlis, Kedah. Interviewed on 29 dan 30 November.

Observation at the border showed that there are thirty-one (31) units of closed-circuit cameras (CCTV) along the single-layer fence at Padang Besar (Malaysia-Thailand Border). According to a NSC official¹², the use of CCTV is only found around the 5.3km MALTHAI single-layer fence area in Padang Besar, Perlis, while other border areas are only covered by two (2) layers of security fences and security walls, without any CCTV. The amount of CCTV is limited in certain areas only and has relatively low specifications. Since CCTV is under the control of the NSC, the PGA does not have any control over the use of CCTV. The PGA only reports to the NSC on the status and damage that occurs (if any), while all repair and maintenance actions will be managed by the NSC and at times, and this sometimes takes quite a long time. According to a KDNKA official¹³, the PGA also uses drones to control the border with the cooperation of the Air Force (PGU). The PGA does not have its own drones and does not have expertise in operating drones. However, for the operation of these drones, the PGA receives regular training and courses from PGU. The functions of these drones are only to record pictures of the smuggling activities that take place and cannot generate any data, make any analysis or have any other roles. This situation has indirectly affected the surveillance and patrolling efforts carried out by the PGA North Brigade and Southeast Brigade enforcement officers, especially in detecting smugglers or migrants who breach the national border. According to Mohan and Shelly (2016), accurate surveillance and preparedness strategies in real time are hard to be carried out in vast and porous border areas. Therefore, the insufficient equipment, especially surveillance systems such as fixed and mobile radar, drones, and intelligence, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems has made it difficult for the authorities to carry out the border control duties. These technologies are essential for states to control long borders with minimal personnel (Matt, 2022) and to address the modus operandi of criminals which is always more advanced in using the sophisticated technology whereby law enforcement agencies may not have acquired such technology to counter these criminal smugglers.

iv. Security patrol of the road, border wall, and fences

The Malaysia-Thailand border along the states of Kedah/Perlis is limited by walls and chain link fences from Padang Besar, Perlis, up to '*Tangga 100*' at Kedah. After '*Tangga 100*', there are no restrictions or obstacles placed along the border as there is an area of dense hills and forests. Meanwhile, for the area before '*Tangga 100*', the chain link fence is quite dilapidated. The condition of the fence is rusted and decayed, making it an easy way to escape from and to smuggle into Malaysian borders. Even the fence is cut by the smugglers. Almost every layer was cut, and the fence repair project took quite a long time¹⁴. The condition of the wide and long border coupled with the condition of the dilapidated fences and unfenced border areas, opens the way for many secluded roads that are constantly changing. This situation has brought difficulties for the PGA to patrol and monitor the border line. With the trend of smuggling activities that always occur at night especially around the border fence of Perlis

¹² The Senior Officer of the KDN Security Division, Putrajaya. 2022. Interviewed on 13 July 2022.

¹³ The PGA Senior Officer, KDNKA, Bukit Aman. 2022. Kuala Lumpur. Interviewed on 15 November.

¹⁴ Ibid

and Felda Bukit Tangga, and the dense residence at Rantau Panjang and Pengkalan Kubur, this provides an opportunity for the local people to cooperate with the smugglers. These situations make it difficult for the PGA to detect evasion by smuggling syndicates or migrants who move individually.

v. Border Areas Not Gazetted as Security Areas (Prohibited Areas)

The issue of border areas not being gazetted as security or restricted areas has been around for a long time. This border area is not gazetted because there is a buffer zone issue in the duty-free complex area in Bukit Kayu Hitam whereby foreigners have access to the area without having to obtain an immigration stamp¹⁵. In this duty-free zone, various activities and transactions can be made by foreigners together with local citizens in collusion such as the exchange of contraband. By getting cooperation from local people, smugglers can find a way to escape from and smuggle into Malaysia without going through the Immigration. This is where the term 'no man's land' comes into existence and intruders are considered innocent, despite the fact that it is Malaysian territory¹⁶. After this buffer zone area, only then smugglers or intruders can be caught, and this is the situation that causes many intruders or smugglers being able to escape. There should be no problem in terms of arrest and enforcement, but in terms of control and surveillance, it really matters. The same situation occurs in Kelantan, whereby after the border, there are local villages and settlements. The outsiders are free to move around this area without permission from the Malaysia Immigration Department and since the settlement land is private land, the area cannot be gazetted. Border areas that are not gazetted as security areas have opened space for invasion and criminal activities. The Authority or PGA cannot control the area and cannot conduct security operations under the Prohibited Areas Act (KLTL) [Act 298] or any act related to public safety and order such as the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC)¹⁷. According to Mohd Na'eim et al. (2017), the houses found along the border fence, especially on the Thailand side, are claimed to have been used as a transit point for these foreigners to be smuggled into Malaysia. The actions of the state authorities that allow the construction of houses on the banks and reserves of the Golok River (on the side of the Rantau Panjang tax-free zone) do facilitate smuggling activities in the border area (Fauzi et al., 2013). These foreign immigrants will move in small groups to facilitate evasion or smuggling through the area to the right of the Bukit Kayu Hitam border gate in the states of Kedah/Perlis. They will wait until night time before cutting the wire fence to sneak in (Azizah, 1987) and smuggling activities often take place around the border fence of Perlis and Felda Bukit Tangga. Usually, they will hide in sugar cane fields and rubber fields as well as hilly areas. There are also smugglers who use the main entrance route of the Thai border at the Duty-Free Complex, Bukit Kayu Hitam, Kedah and go through the back area of the complex and the lakeside area of the 'Black Forest Golf and Country Club' before going through the surrounding fences (Mohd Na'eim et al., 2017). They move alone or in groups through smuggling syndicates and it is difficult to detect their movements particularly for those who enter through syndicates.

¹⁵ The Director of the Malaysian Immigration Department. 2022. Cyberjaya. Interviewed on July 14.

¹⁶ Ibid

¹⁷ Ibid

Recommendations and Conclusion

Based on the findings of the study, the management of border security control at the Malaysia- Thailand border would seem to have some challenges derived from various factors that lead to migrant smuggling activities and limitations faced by the PGA to curb these activities. Monitoring a wide and long border area (Rafidah, Nor Azizan and Zarina, 2019), the challenge of integrity issues (Rafidah, Nor Azizan and Zarina, 2019), utilizing reactive rather than proactive approaches, minimal control mechanisms and the lack of training, technology, and intelligence become rampant limitations for the enforcement agencies. In Malaysia, these limitations have been occurring for a long time and have not been dealt with appropriately. This could be a threat to the country whereby borders are easily breached and exposed to non-traditional criminal activities particularly migrant smuggling.

To conclude, a secured and competitive border does not only depend on efforts to facilitate legal trade and travel, but it also depends on joint efforts to address migrant smuggling (U.S Customs and Border Protection, 2018). To obtain continuous surveillance at the border (Vishwanath, 2019) and achieve management efficiency, border management needs to be completed with several components. **The first component** is the strength of human resources which includes numerous enforcement officers who are trained and have integrity to supervise and patrol the border. This is because the state of the border is wide and porous, the secluded routes are numerous, changeable and have a very complex environment that will make it difficult to enforce border control (Mohan and Shelly, 2016; Rafidah, Nor Azizan and Zarina, 2019), particularly if there are not enough enforcement officers on duties. This wide porous border causes surveillance by humans to become more challenging and it can increase the risk of loss of life. Therefore, it requires human involvement in large numbers (Mohan and Shelly, 2016; Rafidah, Nor Azizan and Zarina, 2019), efficient and well-trained personnel, as well as individuals with high integrity (Shelley, 2014) without having any personal interests, to conduct continuous surveillance of movements day and night (Rohani et al., 2015).

The second component is equipment and the use of various control of high technologies to support human resource management. Since border monitoring should be done in real-time accurately (Mohan and Shelly, 2016), then for the purpose of management efficiency at the border, having good infrastructure for the comfort and welfare of members and the use of high technology are essential to lighten and facilitate the tasks performed by humans. It has been reported that there are two weaknesses in regulating borders, namely domain awareness and mission readiness (Minority Staff Report, 2018). Assets that can move quickly and efficiently are needed to help enforce security controls, especially at long and wide borders (Firdaus and Ikbal, 2021). Norcikeyon et al (2015) have also suggested that existing assets for enforcement activities at the border need to be increased and further improved from the aspect of technological capabilities so that cross-border crime can be tackled more systematically and efficiently. Since this task is very challenging and it faces the risk of losing life, intelligent robots are needed to replace or support human tasks (Vishwanath and Sankar, 2019). An intelligent robot is an intelligent machine based on 'Deep-Learning Patterns' and 'Powerful Computers' such as artificial intelligence (AI) technology which has the ability to learn human behaviour, and to provide responses or reactions like humans (Shabbir and Anwer, 2015). The use of AI technology will potentially help in surveillance and inspection tasks in border security field.

The third component is support from security policies or the implementation of measures related to border management by the government as the main agenda or focus in supporting enforcement efforts by the RMP. For example, the government should make an effort to gazette all the border areas as security areas to enable them to monitor the area. As for the private land, which involves financial issues which makes it hard for the government to control, it is recommended that the local population in that area be moved elsewhere so as to create economic and trade space for them. The government at the same time should consider the construction of concrete walls replacing all wire fences along the border to prevent the fences from being easily cut by smugglers.

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