

State Failure And Terrorism: Thoughts on Nigeria's Festering BOKO Haram Crisis

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ABSTRACT

Nigeria has been enmeshed ultimately in the aspiration towards wrenching itself from economic debacle with which it is now more identified than its prospects. Energy is being dissipated to develop institutions and structures with the capacity to ensure economic growth, equitable distribution of national wealth, political stability and accountability. The attainment of those aspirations requires reduction of threats, actual and potential, that are capable of generating insecurity. The Boko Haram crisis thus set the country on retrogressive rather than progressive march toward achieving improved standard of living. To combat the Boko Haram menace, in view of theoretical leaning that blames uprising against government on internal configuration of the society, thereby emphasising the physical aspect of such uprising, the Nigerian Government is bent on crushing out the group through superior military might as it did during the 1967-1970 civil war. This paper argues that, no doubt, Nigeria's socio-economic configuration is capable of engendering terrorism, Boko Haram is not a formation as vanguard of the people. It examines the activities of the Boko Haram group vis-à-vis the social conflict theory and the theory of fundamentalism and reached the conclusion that war against Boko Haram is more a war of the mind than a physical war and to be sure of total victory over the group, government must engage in that war from fundamentalist perspective.

INTRODUCTION

It is becoming more difficult to determine where Nigeria falls in the categorization of countries, whether 'underdeveloped, undeveloped, developing or de-developing'. Signs of retrogression and retardation are more evident than that of progress, if any. The country is now more defined by its myriads of problems than its promises and enormous potentials as well as the resourcefulness of its people. It is indeed a total paradox- very rich, yet very poor. A very rich country in terms of human and natural resources, including natural gas, petroleum, tin, iron, coal, limestone, niobium, lead, zinc, and arable land. Nigeria is the leading exporter of oil in Africa and the 6th leading oil exporter in the world. Despite the abundance in human and natural resources, Nigeria remains one of the poor countries in the world today. It has the largest population of poor in Africa. Poor management of funds, political instability and poor governance continue to tear the country apart. Although it has the highest number of graduates in the continent, most of them end up on the streets with nothing at all to do; ironically having the highest number of unemployed youths. It has been ranked fourteenth on

the list of one hundred and seventy-seven failed states of the world (Eme & Jide, 2012). The country is grossly degraded in terms of health, education and transportation infrastructure. Despite hundreds of billions of dollars in oil revenue, Nigeria has virtually no functioning rail system and only half of its population has access to electricity. The eighty million Nigerians who have electricity share intermittent access to the amount of power equivalent to what is available in Washington, DC metro area. Living standard for most Nigerians are the same today as they were in 1970 and nearly a hundred million Nigerians live on less than one dollar per day (Eme & Jide, 2012).

Thus, Nigeria has been faced ultimately with the task of wrenching itself from economic debacle with which, as said earlier, it is now more identified than its prospects. The view of Katsina (2012) aptly captures the Nigeria's situation and this is to the effect that the quest for stability and development is, without doubt, the Holy Grail for many third world countries; a never ending, tedious, yet elusive search for that condition under which these countries would be able to develop institutions and structures with the capacity to ensure economic growth, equitable distribution of national wealth, political stability and accountability. As daunting as these may appear, still it is possible to argue that there is a certain level which all countries, developing and even those that are de-developing, aspire to reach. Each country aspires to a high quality of life for its citizenry, strong and diversified economic base, internal cohesion and political stability. How and to what level these aspirations are attained depend on a number of factors, mostly internal. A closely related question for the actualization of those aspirations is that of national security, defined in terms of the capability for defending territorial integrity and for ensuring internal peace and stability. Stretched further, the attainment of those aspirations requires reduction of threats, actual and potential, that are capable of generating insecurity.

For Nigeria, the fight for improved living standard has now assumed a different dimension with the increasing height of terrorism in the country, with particular attention to the Boko Haram crisis. Although the operations of the group remain principally in the northern part of the country, residents of southern Nigeria live in palpable fear of possible Boko Haram attack. By extension, therefore, the country is in a state of uncertainty. The condition into which the sect has now beaten the country is far from what was initially anticipated. At some point in the years following the death of President Umaru Musa Yara'dua, it was adjudged to be the Northern counterpart of the Niger-Delta militant groups. As if now that Nigeria has a President of Niger-Delta extraction, he should face the fire from the North as did President Yar'adua from the Niger-Delta region of the country. There were two principal assumptions in the public domain. One, the northern elements had chosen to make the country ungovernable for a southern president owing to the thinking that the North had been short changed in the country's power configuration or rotation. Two, a collection of Northern youths intended to make a fortune out of the Federal Government by fomenting threats following what was perceived to be a lucrative tactics adopted by the Niger-Delta militants who had managed to scare government into creating the Niger-Delta Ministry and further fashioned out the Amnesty Programme, all in a bid to quell the insurgency in the Niger-Delta region of the country. The Amnesty package included pardon for those militants who, by some claims, had surrendered their weapons, place them on monthly allowance, sent them overseas for empowerment trainings. In a country

where an average citizen live below one dollar (\$1:00) per day, it would appear that being a militant was gainful and government was more inclined to pay attention to threats than alternative means of communication. The reasoning was famous among the populace and was thought to be something to go by when certain northern leaders became disenchanted with federal government reneging on negotiating with the Boko Haram members. Some of them had boldly condemned government for not wanting to interface with the “Northern Boys” as was done with the Niger-Delta Boys. For instance, in an interview granted a correspondent of the Vanguard Newspaper by a northern elder statesman, published on the 21st November, 2012, he had vehemently vilified the government of President Goodluck Jonathan for his insensitivity to the yearnings of the Northern Boys. In his words, “the Federal Government cannot continue to justify its claim of not wanting to dialogue with Boko Haram after it negotiated with Niger Delta militants and offered mouth-watering jobs and contracts to mostly Ijaw boys only to turn around and denounce negotiations with another militant group... is it because the Boko Haram sect leaders are not of Ijaw extraction where Mr. President comes from?” Perhaps, the elders had thought that by such support they could cash in on the booties that might accrue from the activities of the youths.

On the other hand, government appeared confused by the bombardment with plethora of what was deemed to be expert opinions. One, government would not negotiate with insurgent group. Two, the “Boys” had no justifiable reasons unlike their Niger-Delta Counterpart whose land and waters had been rendered abortive on account of pollution due to oil exploration and spillage. To government, therefore, the Boko Haram activities were without basis and should not be encouraged by any proposal for peace talk, negotiation or anything of such. It would appear that in that circumstance government was bent on crushing out the group through prevailing military force. Unfortunately, the group seems to be prevailing on government forces and for almost a decade it has held a good portion of the country to ransom despite government strategies and tactics and claims to be on top of the situation. The continued operations of Boko Haram in spite of government acclaimed attempts to stamp out the organisation has opened up a floodgate of thoughts and opinions, leading to formulation of theories. If theories are indeed a set of related ideas which are postulated with a view to guiding constructive and positive policy making, it is imperative that those theories thrown up by the continued operations of the Boko Haram sect be subjected to thorough intellectual scrutiny. Where such scrutiny is lacking, theories would only occasion policy mislead, misguide and confusion.

To some, perhaps more than any other opinion holders, terrorism in Nigeria, like in other places, is a nemesis consequential to the poor economic condition of the country. This is in accordance with the rendition of Lisanti (2010) when he said conventional wisdom says weak and failing states, with their inability to control their territory, are breeding grounds for terrorism. It is also argued that less developed states, ethnically fractionalized states and non-democratic states create environments where terrorism flourishes. The connections between terrorism and social welfare programs, political rights or education have also been examined and the verdict is almost always the same, that poverty breeds terror. Within the common discourse of American foreign policy, for example, it is assumed that democracy and economic

development are antidotes to terrorism—more democracy and more development will reduce occurrences of terrorism (Patrick 2006). This goes to say that terrorism owes its origin to poverty and deprivation and where the state lives up to its task terrorism may not be an issue. This writer does not feel obliged to accept that line of reasoning. Thus, there is the need to reassess some of the thoughts thrown up by the Boko Haram crisis with a view to attaining superior reasoning to guide us in dealing with the situation. This paper is divided into five parts: the first part re-establishes the natural obligation of the Nigerian State to guarantee national security. The second part renders a narrative on the Boko Haram terrorism. The third part looks at the theories the crisis has elicited and tries to reassess the theories aforementioned in juxtaposition with the Nigerian situation to be sure as to whether or not terrorism necessarily produces from state performance and, more so, whether it is or it is not safe to conclude that the Boko Haram crisis is necessarily incidental to the Nigeria's economic circumstance. The fifth part recommends and concludes based on the forgoing.

STATE AND SECURITY OBLIGATION

It has been asserted that a working theory of state must, in fact, be conceived in institutional terms, which is subject to a test of moral adequacy (Harold, 2004:25). It is therefore the degree of institutional adequacy or administrative performance that determines whether or not an entity qualifies as a state. Thus, by implication, a state may so be by having a definite territory, a people, a government, economy etc, but still fails the moral test of adequacy. In the institutional perspective therefore, what is important in defining a state is the degree to which the purpose of state as an institution is fulfilled. The query is 'why should all states be classified as equal when indeed they fulfil their obligations unequally?' Put differently, a definition of state must reflect its internal configuration.

One obvious consensus among the divergent perspectives of the purpose of state is that it is the formation of the people for their own benefits. More briefly but precisely, the state is a tool fabricated for the attainment of popular goals. Whatever purpose the state serves must therefore be to the interest of the people. It is on this ground that scholars base their argument that state is a means to an end. To the likes of Aristotle, Locke, Adams Smith and Spencer (Appadorai, 1974:39), state exists for the sake of that kind of life which is the end of man. The state, according to the Aristotelian philosophy, is a ladder collectively built by the people by which they should be conveyed to the aspired life which is unattainable through individual efforts. According to Locke, the state's obligation is ethical; to ensure the convenience of its citizens. To him, the great and chief end of men uniting into commonwealth and putting themselves under government is the preservation of their lives and property. Adams Smith opines that state has only three duties to which it should attend: the duty of protecting society from violence and invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member of society from injustice or opposition of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; and, thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public institutions. Herbert Spencer sums it up with the view that state is a joint-stock protection company for mutual assurance. This is the reasoning of Chaturvedi (2006:294) when he says:

The original, primary, and immediate end of the state is the maintenance of peace, order, security, and justice among the people who compose it. No state which fails to achieve these ends in a reasonable degree can justify its existence. Secondly, the state must look beyond the needs of the individual as such but the larger collective ends of society- the welfare of the group. It must cater for the common interest and promote the national progress by doing for the society the things which the common interests require, but which cannot be done at all, or done efficiently, by individuals acting singly or through voluntary associations.

The state is therefore essentially and primarily a formation for the purpose of 'security' which is capable of ensuring the desired life. It is in this view that Harold J. Laski (2004:25) sees state as an organization for enabling the mass of men to realize social good on the largest possible scale. According to Robert-Okah (2014), the state is generally presented as a people organized for law and development in a given territory. As a result, the state requires the element of the people, law and order, territory and development, encapsulated in sovereignty to operate. The state serves utilitarian purposes; hence, it is not end in itself. The purpose of the state is to ensure secured people for development. The term security has been used to mean protection against or safety from a future risk of severe deprivation, injury or death and requires rules, order and impartial adjudication and application. Security according to Achumba, Ighomereho & Akpo-Robaro (2013) refers to a situation that exists as a result of the establishment of measure for the protecting of persons, information and property against hostile persons, influences and actions. It is the existence of conditions within which people in a society can go about their normal daily activities without any threat to their lives or properties. It embraces all measures designed to protect and safeguard the citizenry and the resources of individuals, groups, businesses and the nation against sabotage or violent occurrence. Security is the protection against all forms of harm whether physical, economic or psychological. Certainly, the Nigerian State is not unaware of this obligation and, perhaps, this explains the country's efforts at bringing Boko Haram group to its knees.

Boko Haram: Origin and Operations.

Nobody has succeeded in describing Boko Haram in any distilled or distinct manner. As days go by, it continues to generate different and divergent views. It has been variously described as a radical religious sect, a violent insurgent group, a terrorist organization, a network of criminal gangs, a political tool and a cult. In its early days, some saw it as a social movement for the poor. It has always been anti-state and has always purported to pursue an Islamist agenda. It has not always been so extreme or so indiscriminate in its violence. It is possible to ascribe multiple definitions and motivations to the movement since it comprises a complex set of individuals and interests that have been evolving for over a decade (Perouse de Montclos, 2014). Generally, however, there is a consensus that Boko Haram, which means "Western education is forbidden," was founded in 2002 by an Islamist cleric named Mohammed Yusuf in response to Nigeria's democratic transition, nationalism and Western influence. The group's official name is not Boko Haram but *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad*, which means

“People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad.” Members are known to reference the Islamic verse that states, “Anyone who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors (Ryan Mauro, 2015).” Boko Haram is an Islamic sect that believes politics in northern Nigeria has been seized by a group of corrupt, false Muslims. It wants to wage a war against them, and the Federal Republic of Nigeria generally, to create a “pure” Islamic state ruled by sharia law. According to John Campbell (2014), the movement has a rhetoric that its goal is to create God’s kingdom on earth through justice for the poor achieved by the rigid application of Islamic law, or Sharia. Anything that gets in the way of this goal must be destroyed. For Boko Haram, violence is not a perversion of Islam; it is a justifiable means to a pure end. In Andrew Walker’s account (2012), Boko Haram’s origins lie in a group of radical Islamist youth who worshipped at the Alhaji Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri a decade ago. In 2002, an offshoot of this youth group (not yet known as Boko Haram) declared the city and the Islamic establishment to be intolerably corrupt and irredeemable. The group declared it was embarking on hijra (a withdrawal along the lines of the Prophet Muhammad’s withdrawal from Mecca to Medina). It moved from Maiduguri to a village called Kanama, Yobe state, near the border with Niger, to set up a separatist community run on hard-line Islamic principles. Its leader, Mohammed Ali, espoused antistate ideology and called on other Muslims to join the group and return to a life under “true” Islamic law, with the aim of making a more perfect society away from the corrupt establishment. In December 2003, following a community dispute regarding fishing rights in a local pond, the group got into a conflict with the police. Group members overpowered a squad of officers and took their weapons. This confrontation led to a siege of its mosque by the army that lasted into the New Year. The siege ended in a shootout in which most of the group’s seventy members were killed, including Mohammed Ali. The few survivors of the group returned to Maiduguri, where they settled back with others from the youth group that had originated at the Ndimi mosque. The leader of this Maiduguri group, Mohammed Yusuf, then embarked on the process of establishing the group’s own mosque in Maiduguri. This new mosque, named the Ibn Taimiyyah Masjid, was built on land to the north of the center of town, near the railway station, owned by Yusuf’s father-in-law, Baba Fugu Mohammed. The group was apparently left alone by the authorities, and it expanded into other states, including Bauchi, Yobe, and Niger state. The group’s neighbors in Maiduguri dubbed the group Boko Haram, which roughly translates as “Western education is forbidden” in Hausa.

Theories and Perspective on the Boko Haram Crisis

1. Social Conflict Theory/ Socio-Economic Perspective

The social conflict theory looks at the internal configuration of a society to explain the occurrences therein. The socio-economic perspective of the theory, which blames social conditions and principally economic factors for internal violence, is anchored on the human needs theory of social conflicts. Its central thesis is that all humans have basic needs which they seek to fulfil and failure caused by other individuals or groups to meet these needs could lead to conflict (Rosati et al, 1990 cited in Faleti, p. 51). The theory is similar to the frustration-aggression theory of violence, which posits that aggression is always a consequence of

frustration (Dougherty and Pfaltzgrate Jr, 1990: 266). According to the theory, relative deprivation is a perceived disparity between value expectation and value capabilities and that the lack of a need satisfaction – defined as a gap between aspirations and achievement generally – relies on the psychological state of frustration and aggressive attitudes emanating from it (Midlarsky, 1975:29).

The socio-economic perspective of the social conflict theory sees the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria essentially within the purview of socio-economic configuration of the Nigerian society and attempts to de-emphasise or, if possible, debunk any opinion that Boko Haram is particularly a Muslim or Northern crisis (Kukah, 2012). As argued by Eme & Jide (2012), Nigerians are hungry for progress and an improvement in their lives, but northern Nigerians feel this need most acutely. Life in Nigeria for many is tough, but across the North, life is grim. A UN study shows that poverty in the 12 most northern states is nearly twice that of the rest of the country. The health indicators reflect this. Children in the far north are almost four times as likely to be malnourished. Child mortality is over 200 deaths per 1000 live births, leading to lower life expectancy. Educational standards are just as bad. Literacy in the far north is 35 percent as opposed to 77 percent in the rest of the country. Seventy-seven percent of women in the far north have no formal education, compared to only 17 percent in the rest of the country. In northern Nigeria, primary school attendance is only 41 percent, while youth unemployment is extremely high. All of this contributes to joblessness and a deepening cycle of poverty (Carson, 2012:2).

The statistics are disturbing, but they are not the whole story. Poverty in northern Nigeria is increasing. Despite a decade in which the Nigerian economy expanded at a spectacular seven percent per year, the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics estimates that extreme poverty is 10 percent higher than in 2004. It is even worse in the North. Income inequality is growing rapidly. These trends are worrying for economic, political, and security reasons (Carson, 2012:4). Public opinion polls and news reports suggest that there is a strong sentiment throughout the country, but especially in the North, that government is not on the side of the people; and that their poverty is a result of government neglect, corruption, and abuse. This is the type of popular narrative that is ripe for an insurgent group to hijack for its own purpose (Campbell and Bunche, 2011:4).

The Boko Haram challenge seems to reflect the deeper economic crisis bedeviling the Nigerian state. Adibe (2012) captures the depth of the challenge when he argues that: the Nigerian state, contrary to the media hype, is regarded as the enemy, not just by Boko Haram, but by several Nigerians and groups, each attacking it with as much ferocity as Boko Haram's bombs, using whatever means they have at their disposal: politicians entrusted to protect our common patrimony steal the country blind, law enforcement officers see or hear no evil at a slight inducement, government workers drag their feet and refuse to give their best while revelling in moonlighting, organized labour inducing university lecturers in public institutions to go on indefinite strikes on a whim while journalists accept 'brown envelopes' to turn truth on its head or become uncritical champions of a selected anti-Nigerian state identity. What all these groups have in common with Boko Haram is that they believe that the premise on which they act is justifiable and that the Nigerian state is unfair to them, if not an outright enemy (cited in

Uzodike and Maiangwa, op.cit. p. 98). It is certainly in support of this view that Pérouse de Montclos (2014), speaking about Boko Haram, concluded that the movement grew out of socio-economic flux that came with a process of democratic transition, coupled with the consequences of decades of mismanagement resulting from military rule and corruption.

If we align ourselves to the social conflict theory and its economic perspective, we are forced to accept that the organisation seeks socio-economic reconstruction, which means that, after all, it is a popular movement and by extension Boko Haram is a vanguard of freedom for the oppressed, the voice of the voiceless and champion of a popular cause. The logic in that reasoning will be subjected to test in juxtaposition with the Extremist and its associated Radicalist and Religious Fundamentalist Theories.

The /Radicalist/ Extremist/ Religious Fundamentalist Theory Of Boko Haram Crisis

Another perspective to the Boko Haram crisis hangs on religious fundamentalism, radicalism and extremism. These three terms may appear interchangeable, but they require some elucidation for the purpose of this paper.

According to the European Parliament briefing (March, 2015), radicalism is defined as 'the phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to terrorism'. A 2008 report by the European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation suggests that radicalisation can be considered as socialisation to extremism, which may lead to terrorism. It follows that preventing radicalisation is an important element in counter-terrorist measures, to reduce the threat of radicalised individuals engaging in terrorist activity. In social sciences, the term 'radicalisation' or 'radicalism' is not defined uniformly (with the latter used to mark legitimate opposition to mainstream political orientation with the intention to bring about reform). Moreover, in political discourse it is often used interchangeably with notions such as 'extremism'. Although these phenomena can be said to share the same objective – challenging the existing order – the objectives may be different. One interpretation is that while radicalism seeks to modify the existing political and social structure, it need not be violent; hence the adjective 'violent' is often added. 'Extremism' is associated with active adoption of an ideology, intending to deliberately apply violence to remove a state's structure and its elite (George Joffe, 2012). Another approach defines radicalism as a quest for sweeping change, while limiting extremism to the pursuit of concrete and localised political ideologies (Daniela PISOIU, 2012). The political aspect is also emphasised by Peter Neumann (2010) who defines radicalisation as 'the process (or processes) whereby individuals or groups come to approve of and (ultimately) participate in the use of violence for political aims'.

Ideology forms an inseparable part of the radicalisation process. Nevertheless, it is suggested that ideology is not, alone, decisive but has to be complemented by other factors – political and social environment, and a psychological need for identity. Using religion as a useful narrative, a cognitive framework is built on religious fundamentalism and other ideologies to create solidarity and increase loyalty to the cause (Daniela PISOIU, 2012). Religious fundamentalism, often at the heart of radicalisation, can be defined as a belief in an absolute religious truth which is challenged by the forces of evil and which must be followed today in the same way as in the past. It can be seen to rely on three attitudes: one, believers should go back to absolute

and unchangeable rules established in the past; two, these rules allow for only one interpretation to be held among believers and three, religious rules should prevail over secular ones. Fundamentalism may be understood in terms of whatever it is 'against'. Often it is used as a pejorative description for anyone who is regarded as having a closed mind with regard to a particular issue (Ruud Koopmans, 2014). It has been suggested that, given the pressing need to be able to identify, predict, locate and so counter any potential terrorising extremism born of certain expressions of religion, then the task of analysing the phenomenon of religious fundamentalism so as to construct a heuristic paradigm capable of providing a measure of predictability would seem both obvious and urgent. Douglas Pratt (2006) holds the view that 'religious fundamentalism' denotes a worldview-type that can be found across different religions in the world of today. Specifically, the term denotes a paradigm that paves the way for a shift in mentality from the relative harmlessness of an otherwise quaint, ultra-conservative religious belief system to a religiously motivated and fanatically followed engagement in aggressively impositional, even terrorising, activity. Understanding the structure, logic, and implementation of this paradigm is of vital importance in the endeavour to create any meaningful counter terrorist capability able to address religiously motivated and sourced terrorism. The St. Luke's News and Reviews Sunday School, 29 October 2000 identifies beliefs and actions of extreme religious fundamentalism to include:

1. Beliefs are based on divine and revealed texts, which are considered perfect and cannot be questioned.
2. Beliefs are elaborate and detailed, constructed by selectively interpreting divine texts.
3. Beliefs are often at variance with common sense, reason, logic, and science.
4. The group includes a single living individual with special privileged relationship to God, unlike anyone else's relationship or status.
5. Members must adhere strictly to all details of doctrine.
6. Members reject all other religions and belief systems, including ones similar to their own.
7. Members are intolerant of anyone outside the group, with different beliefs.
8. Extreme and hateful actions are justified by the group's beliefs.
9. Members are smug, self-satisfied, self-righteous, and egotistical, about their beliefs and their group.

MODE OF OPERATION OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCE SINCE 2011

YEARS	NO. OF TIMES BOMBING	NO. OF TIMES RAID/NIGHT ATTACKS	NO. OF TIMES ASSASSINATION/KIDNAPP	NO. OF TIMES PRISON BREAK	IN APPROMIXATION DEATH RATE	INJURED
2011	16	3	6	1	300	UNKNOWN
2012	11	5	3	1	792	UNKNOWN
2013	1	8			1000-1007	UNKNOWN
2014	14	23	8	1	2848	UNKNOWN
2015	30	22	6		3042 (As at July 2015)	UNKNOWN

It is pertinent to note that these figures do not represent the exact figures but approximate figures. However, this statistics equal reveals graphically the picture of the changing characteristics of the Boko Haram phenomenon. It reveals that the Boko Haram insurgency has been gaining momentum as days to by and their tactics changes as their powers increases. There has also been continuous increase in the number of deaths as well as the number of attacks.

In 2011, estimate of about 26 attacks were recorded and about 300 persons dead. In 2012, it reduced attacks but he death toll increase from 300 to 792, this is owed to raid attacks notable was Jan 20, 2012 in Kano in which Boko Haram gunmen attacked killing about 183 people civilians and police officers.

In 2013, the raid also increased as, however the insurgents regrouped and diversified their means of attack in all dimension leading to about 2848 death recorded. In bomb attacks, 23 raids, 8 assassinations and one prison break. The kidnapping of about 278 Chibok girls is worth mentioning were as it generated political as well as sociological questions.

Conclusion

Premised on syllogistic reasoning, the verdict reached on Boko Haram crisis on the scale of the economic perspective of social conflict theory is certainly sound in view of available facts: one, Nigeria falls within the category of failed states. Two, failed states are fertile grounds for breeding terror. Therefore, terrorism in Nigeria is as a result of its failed nature. Sound as that verdict might be, it has to be tested under the weight of prevailing facts. The approach is to employ the imaginary scale of judgement which decision is based on facts presented. On this scale are placed two contending theories in relation to Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria. One, the social conflict theory, is to the effect that failure of state necessarily occasions terror. The

other, religious fundamentalist theory, maintains that it is possible for terror to rage in a society where the state fulfils its obligations, especially if the terror is linked to religious convictions.

As canvassed by adherents to the social conflict theory and its frustration/aggression corollary, terrorism is one of the strategies employed by disgruntled groups for social re-engineering. Considering the fact that poverty is more evident in the northern part of Nigeria, there are suggestions that the activities of Boko Haram are expressions of northern peoples' frustration. It is a fight against a corrupt government. This leads to a conclusion that if the Nigerian state embarks on a massive education and infrastructural development in the north terrorism will be a thing of the past. Such conclusion needs to be criticized within the framework of the mode of operations of Boko Haram. It raises questions of legitimacy, whether the northern people indeed feel represented by Boko Haram. It remains to be answered what sense it makes if the people for whom their nefarious activities are fomented are not in support of the killings. Put differently, do the northerners see Boko Haram as fighting for them? Do you exterminate a people in order to save them? Available facts are to the effect that more northerners have lost their lives and properties than any part of the country due to Boko Haram insurgency. In a single sweep, about two hundred and fifty students were abducted from their school in Chibok on the 15th April, 2014 and their whereabouts is yet unknown, causing the severest trauma in the same region they are claimed to be fighting for. The point under labour is that, yes, failure on the part of the state may occasion terrorism, the Boko Haram insurgency goes beyond a cry for social reconstruction if not absolutely away from it.

It is safer and accords more with reason and intellect to see Boko Haram as an idea fuelled by religious fundamentalism. As observed by Gupta (2005:16 cited in Asuelime and David, 2015:23), a mushrooming literature showing a weak link between socio-political and economic structural factors, such as poverty, lack of economic opportunity, and terrorism, casts doubts on the efficacy of the root causes thesis. In fact, some jettisoned the root causes perspective as "misleading as an explanation for terrorism or prescription for dealing with it" (Jervis 2002, p. 41). An interview with 250 members in most Palestine militia groups observes that "none of them were uneducated, desperately poor, simple-minded, or depressed. Many were middle class and, unless they were fugitive, held paying jobs; thus suggesting a weak or no correlation between terrorism and root causes such as socio-economic conditions" (Hassan 2001, p. 37). Similarly, studies have shown that "none of the 19 perpetrators of 9/11 attacks suffered from poverty, lack of education or lack of exposure to the privileged lifestyle of the Western world" (Gupta 2005, p. 19).

From the forgoing, it is submitted that government would have to engage the fight against Boko Haram from viewed from fundamentalist perspective. Put differently, Boko Haram crisis is a war of the mind, victory over which does not lie in the deployment of physical weapons or superior military might.

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