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International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences

Open Access Journal

ISSN: 2222-6990

One Company, Two Classes: Unpacking the Rationale and Ramifications of Dual-Class Share Structure

Shanshan Yue, Norkhairul Hafiz Bajuri, Saleh F. A. Khatib, Ninglin Li

http://dx.doi.org/10.6007/IJARBSS/v14-i1/20537

Open access

This research paper presents a thorough literature review on the origins of Dual-Class Sharing Structure (DCS) and their influence on agency problems. The study delves into existing research that predominantly supports the utilization of DCS, but also reveals inconsistent attitudes towards this structure. Throughout the investigation of DCS origins, we found that the existing literature revolved around three key aspects: market environment, corporate characteristics, and decision-makers, aligning seamlessly with the historical trajectory of DCS. In exploring agency theory, we found a major focus on whether DCS exacerbates or mitigates agency issues, which sparks divergent discussions due to the intricate interplay between internal and external governance. The conflicting perspectives surrounding DCS underscore the significance of further research in understanding the complex relationship between corporate governance and agency challenges. As the debate continues, our review contributes to the academic discourse, shedding light on the evolution of DCS and its impact on the broader corporate landscape.

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(Yue et al., 2024)
Yue, S., Bajuri, N. H., Khatib, S. F. A., & Li, N. (2024). One Company, Two Classes: Unpacking the Rationale and Ramifications of Dual-Class Share Structure. International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, 14(1), 1229–1240.