ISSN: 2225-8329
Open access
Nowadays, in large corporations, owing to the vast number of owners and shareholders, the direct control by owners over firm performance is impossible and this group can only participate in the results of operations. Therefore, it is reasonable that they come to protect their interests and optimally control behavior of employed managers via establishing appropriate monitoring mechanisms. The main objective of this research is to investigate effect of institutional owners on monitoring costs. Based on this objective, a sample of 84 Tehran stock exchange-listed firms over the period 2006-2012 is analyzed statistically. In order to extract a robust model, Pearson correlation coefficient and multivariate regression are used and to test significance of regression model and coefficients, F-test and T- test are utilized respectively. Moreover, the monitoring cost is considered the sum of audit fees and executive compensation in current research. The findings indicated that there is a significantly positive relationship between institutional ownership and monitoring cost. The results also revealed that institutional ownership is significantly and positively associated to audit fees and executive compensation.
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In-Text Citation: (Kiamehr et al., 2015)
To Cite this Article: Kiamehr, M., Moghaddam, A. A., Alipour, S., & Hajeb, H. R. (2015). Examining the Impact of Institutional Ownership on Monitoring Cost: The Case of Iranian Firms Listed on Tehran Stock Exchange. International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting Finance and Management Sciences, 5(4), 29–42.
Copyright: © 2015 The Author(s)
Published by Human Resource Management Academic Research Society (www.hrmars.com)
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