ISSN: 2222-6990
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Clausewitz famously stated that strategy is done by tactics. At tactical level, both tangible and intangible skills are important for the Malaysian Security Forces (SF) combatting communist insurgents in adverse weather conditions and difficult terrains. This research studies the strategic utility of intangible of skills and its impact on the tactical performance of Malaysian Security Forces personnel during Counter Insurgency campaigns against the armed struggle of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) in the 1970’s. The key argument profounder by this article is that the tactical effectiveness of Malaysian Security Forces personnel was heavily influenced by the qualities of its men which cannot be quantified such as courage, bravery, morale and leadership. The Counter Insurgency campaign was fought at close range in isolated jungle terrain. Thus, men at tactical level must perform exceptionally well in facing the insurgents at close range with little warning. What provided the tactical edge in such close violent skirmishes was the superior intangible qualities, which had enabled the Malaysian Security Forces personnel to perform tactically better than their foes and ultimately produced immense strategic effects that led to the ultimate defeat of the CPM armed struggle. Intangible of skills performed by men of the past should not left un-notice; instead, it should be further developed and nurtured for within future security forces.
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In-Text Citation: (Harun, Kernain, & Saudi, 2019)
To Cite this Article: Harun, A. L., Kernain, N. F. Z., & Saudi, N. S. M. (2019). Intangible of Skills at Tactical Level of Strategy in Malaysia’s Counter Insurgency Experience in 1970’s. International Journal of Academic Research Business and Social Sciences, 9(1), 1288–1297.
Copyright: © 2019 The Author(s)
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